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Abstract 
Protothetic is one of the most stimulating systems for propositional logic. Including quantifiers and 
an inference rule for definitions, it is a very interesting mean for the study of many questions of 
metalogic. Unfortunately, it only exists in an axiomatic version, far too complicated and unusual to 
be easily understood by nowadays students in logic. In this paper, we present a system which is a 
natural deduction (in Fitch-Jaśkowski’s style) version of protothetic. According to us, this system 
is adequate for teaching Leśniewski’s logic to students accustomed to natural deduction. 
 
1. What is protothetic? 
Leśniewski’s protothetic is one of the richest systems of propositional logic1. It is often 
described as a “generalized” system for the propositional calculus. This means that it includes 
not only the standard connectives, but also the use of quantifiers binding propositional 
variables, variables for connectives and in fact variables for functions of any order or category 
(like connectives, properties of connectives, operations on connectives, properties of such 
operations, etc). One of the important features of such an ambitious calculus is that its formal 
language cannot be restricted once and for all to any set of categories. On the contrary, it must 
always remain open to the infinitely many possibilities of new and more complex categories 
to be further introduced. Conceiving protothetic, Leśniewski faced with two main difficulties 
for which he discovered very interesting solutions. 
The first difficulty is that the notion of well formed formula had to be relativised to a stage 
or a development of the formal language. Leśniewski’s solution is known as the contextual 
conception of formal language. This conception is grounded on the key-notions of what is 
called today a categorical grammar. The most famous development of this idea is K. 
Ajdukiewicz’s notion of syntactic connexion (Ajdukiewicz 1935). 
The second difficulty was the elaboration of a procedure for the introduction of new 
constants not only of already available categories, but also of new ones. Leśniewski’s solution 
was to elaborate an explicitly codified procedure for definitions conceived as an inference rule 
of his system. Contrary to the standard view (originated in the Principia Mathematica), 
Leśniewski’s definitions do not simply introduce convenient abbreviations, but make the 
language richer and play an important role in proofs. 
Protothetic is not a system in the usual sense of this word, but a logical formal machinery 
which allows several developments. A development is comparable to a chain of definitional 
expansions in the standard paradigm. The main difference lies in the fact that a development 
in protothetic is not a plurality of systems with relations being studied from the metalanguage. 
All the stages of a development are grounded on a unique formal axiom basis, which warrants 
all along the development certain metalogical properties, like soundness and consistency. 
Searching adequate axioms for protothetic, Leśniewski tried to have only one primitive 
connective. He made the choice of biconditional (material equivalence), for it allows to state 
definitions in a very natural form. But he was held up in doing this at the beginning by his 
inability to reduce all the other connectives in terms of quantified biconditionals. The solution 
was found by the young Alfred Tarski in his PhD dissertation (1923), by quantifying not just 
propositional variables, but also variables for unary connectives. 
                                                          
1 For detailed presentations, see Słupecki (1953), Miéville (1984, 2001) and Urbaniak (2014). 
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If we adopt Leśniewski’s notation for (universal) quantifiers, with which a formula like  
( )( )(( ) ( ))p q p q q p  is written ) ( )pq p q q p , then a usual axiom basis for proto-
thetic (cf. Słupecki 1954) is given by the following four axioms (in which quantifiers bind 
propositional variables and variables for unary connectives): 
Ax1: ) (( ) ( ))pqr p q r q p r  
Ax2: ) ( ) ( )pq p q f f p f q  
Ax3: ) ( ) ( )) ( )pq p q f f p f q p q  
Ax4: ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( )f f p p f p p p p q f p p f q  
and the following five inference rules: 
- Rule of substitution (elimination of the universal quantifier); 
- Rule of detachment (modus ponens for biconditional); 
- Rule of distribution (distribution of the quantifier to both arguments of a biconditional); 
- Rule of definition (for stating quantified biconditional as definition-thesis); 
- Rule of extensionality (for stating thesis similar to Ax2, for any defined category). 
2. Teaching protothetic 
Leśniewski’s systems have been strongly overshadowed by Hilbertian style of formal systems 
and by model theory. But the interest of the former for the metatheory of logic and for the 
philosophy of logic remains very large. Among the important topics which are concerned, one 
can mention at least the following: the theory of categories (which is a syntactical version of 
simple type theory), the theory of definitions (which gives a good tool for the study of the 
importance of definitions in the foundational programs), the theory of many-orders quantifiers 
(which extract the theory of quantifiers from their objectual interpretation), a renewed notion 
of adequate set of primitives in axiom theories, etc. 
But, as one can imagine when just looking at the above axiom system, teaching 
Leśniewski’s logic is a big challenge. It has only been taken up by a very few logicians. 
Today’s students are accustomed to streamlined methods of working with propositional logic. 
Protothetic must appear to them very difficult to understand and to work with. The reason is 
not simply a question of complexity. First, the style of presentation is specific to an old period 
of time, unknown to the students (in this respect, teaching Hilbert’s or even Frege’s original 
systems is also a challenge). But, it is known by testimonies that, in everyday’s works, 
Leśniewski himself used a sort of natural deduction system for finding proofs. The idea was 
to make assumptions, then to examine their consequences and to collect the results into 
conditionals or biconditionals. This is just like our students of logic are accustomed. 
Jaśkowski’s well-known natural deduction system has probably been inspired by these 
uncodified practices (Jaśkowski 1934). Unfortunately, no one decided to work on such a 
system of inference rules in the case of protothetic. 
The main problems with a natural deduction system for protothetic is the status of 
definitions and the codification of rules which must consider the fact that the notion of well 
formed formula is contextual and modified each time a new definition is stated. 
In the following sections, we present such a system, using semi-codified inference rules. 
Like original protothetic, our system, called PND is not a system in the usual sense, but a 
basis of rules with a few primitive constants (biconditional and universal quantifiers) allowing 
different developments. Our purpose is not to present PND in a rigorous manner, but to show, 
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by the way of an example of development, how the system works. In our example, we will see 
how to define the propositional constants for truth, falsity and negation. After each definition, 
we will also show how specific rules for the use of the new constants can be derived. A 
rigorous presentation of the rules of PND and a proof that the addition of a rule for exten-
sionality makes the system equivalent to protothetic will be presented in a forthcoming paper. 
 
3. A natural deduction system for protothetic 
A development in the natural deduction system PND is a unique proof, which contains sub-
deductions elaborated by applying the basic inference rules, described by the following 
schemas: 
 
Rule hyp Rule rep 
 
n 1  hyp n  n  
     OR 
n+m m  hyp   n, rep    n, rep 
 
 
Rule e      Rule i  
 
n   n  l  
m    OR m     
       m  
  n, m, e    n, m, e  n  
        
      o  
        l-m, n-o, i  
 
 
Rule ( )ass g  Rule sub 
 
n ( )  m 1 1n nv v v  
 
 ( )  n, ( )ass g   1 1 ( / )n nv v v  m, sub ( / )nv  
    where - 1 1n nv v v  are n different variables; 
      - is a wff of the same category as nv ; 
      - ( / )nv is the result of the replacement in  of all free  
          occurrences of nv  by ; 
      - all the free occurrences of variables in  remain free after the  
          replacement; 
      - the main quantifier is deleted if it is empty after the operation. 
Rule gen 
 
m 1 nv v  
   where - 1 nv v  are n different variables; 
     - the sub-deduction does not depend on hypotheses; 
o     - no rep in the sub-deduction with free occurrences of 1 nv v . 
 1 nv v  m-o, gen 
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Rule def 
 
m 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )n i j n nv v v v v v v v  def 
 
where - 1 nv v  are n different variables, if 0n  the main quantifier is deleted; 
  - 1( )nv v , the definiens, is a formula of the category of propositions containing only symbols  
      previously available in the development; 
  - 1( ) ( )i j nv v v v , the definiendum, is a formula of the category of propositions with only one  
      occurrence of each symbol (apart from symbols for parentheses); it contains only one constant ,  
      which is a new symbol (not already used in the development); 
  - the definiendum and the definiens have the same free variables. 
 
This account of the different basic rules is of course informal. A completely and rigorous 
presentation would have been much longer and much more precise in particular concerning 
the way to manage with the notion of well formed formula of a certain given category. This 
notion is difficult to precise, because it is relative to what has already been written in the 
development. In other words, the notion of a well formed formula is context dependent. But 
all the tools needed for that rigorous description are available in Leśniewski’s work (1992). 
Now, the aim of this paper is not to reach this rigorous account, but to give a sufficiently 
precise description in order to use the system in a quite intuitive way. 
4. An example of development 
In the following pages, we are going to present an example of development. As one will see in 
the first lines, each time a sub-deduction is constructed and the variables kept free in this sub-
deduction, one can refer to it further as a derived rule. So during the development, the set of 
available inference rules increases. By convention, we will always write the new derived rules 
on the right of the development. 
0.1 pq   p q     hyp  Rule com  
0.2    q    hyp  (derived from 0.1-0.8) 
0.3    p q    0.1, rep n   
0.4    p    0.2, 0.3, e    n , com  
0.5    p    hyp 
0.6    p q    0.1, rep 
0.7    q    0.5, 0.6, e  
0.8   q p     0.1-0.4, 0.5-0.7, i  
0.9   q p     hyp 
0.10   p q     0.9, com  
0.11  ( ) ( )p q q p    0.1-0.8, 0.9-0.10, i  
1 ( ) ( )pq p q q p    0.1-0.11, gen 
It is worth noting that there are no theorems of the system itself, but only of a given 
development. All theorems are written on the main vertical stroke. Line 1 is here the first 
theorem of our development. 
1.1 p   p     hyp 
1.2   p     1.1, rep 
1.3  p p      1.1-1.2, 1.1-1.2, i  
2 p p p      1.1-1.3, gen 
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2.1 pqr  p q      hyp  Rule syll  
2.2  q r      hyp  (derived from 2.1-2.13) 
2.3   p     hyp  m  
2.4   p q     2.1, rep n  
2.5   q     2.3, 2.4, e    m, n, syll  
2.6   q r     2.2, rep 
2.7   r     2.5, 2.6, e  
2.8   r     hyp 
2.9   q r     2.2, rep 
2.10   q     2.8, 2.9, e  
2.11   p q     2.1, rep 
2.12   p     2.10, 2.11, e  
2.13  p r      2.3-2.7, 2.8-2.12, i  
This last part of the development has not the status of a proof, but only that of a deduction. It 
allows us to state a convenient derived rule. The following part of the development leads to 
the proof of what is known as Łukasiewicz’s axiom for the complete biconditional calculus 
with quantifiers binding propositional variables (cf. theorem on line 4). This will be sufficient 
to show that our development is (potentially) at least as strong as this calculus. 
2.14 pqr  ( )p q r    hyp 
2.15   ( )p q r    2.14, ( )ass g  
2.16   ( )p q r    hyp  Rule ( )ass d  
2.17   ( )r p q    2.16, com  (derived from 2.16-2.23) 
2.18   ( ) ( )p q q p   1, rep, sub ( / , /p p q q ) n ( )  
2.19   ( )r q p    2.17, 2.18, syll   ( )  n, ( )ass d  
2.20   ( )r q p    2.19, ( )ass g  
2.21   ( ) ( )q r r q   1, rep, sub ( / , /p q q r ) 
2.22   ( )q r p    2.21, 2.21, syll  
2.23   ( )p q r    2.22, com  
2.24  ( ( )) (( ) )p q r p q r  2.14-2.15, 2.16-2.23, i  
3 ( ( )) (( ) )pqr p q r p q r  2.14-2.24, gen 
3.1 pq  p      hyp  Rule conj  
3.2  q      hyp  (derived from 3.1-3.7) 
3.3   p     hyp  m  
3.4   q     3.2, rep n  
3.5   q     hyp    m, n, conj  
3.6   p     3.1, rep 
3.7  p q      3.3-3.4, 3.5-3.6, i  
3.8 pqr  ( ) ( )r q p r    hyp 
3.9   (( ) )r q p r    3.8, ass  
3.10   ( ( )) (( ) )r q p r q p  3, rep, sub ( / , / , /p r q q r p ) 
3.11   ( ( ))r q p r    3.10, 3.9, syll  
3.12   ( ( ))r r q p    3.11, com  
3.13   ( ) ( )r r q p    3.12, ass  
3.14   r r      2, rep, sub ( /p r ) 
6 
 
3.15   q p      3.13, 3.14, e  
3.16   p q      3.15, com  
3.17   p q      hyp 
3.18   q p      3.17, com  
3.19   r r      2, rep, sub ( /p r ) 
3.20   ( ) ( )r r q p    3.18, 3.19, conj  
3.21   ( ( ))r r q p    3.20, ass  
3.22   ( ( )) (( ) )r q p r q p  3, rep, sub ( / , / , /p r q q r p ) 
3.23   (( ) )r r q p    3.21, 3.22, syll  
3.24   (( ) )r q p r    3.23, com  
3.25   ( ) ( )r q p r    3.24, ass  
3.26  ( ) (( ) ( ))p q r q p r   3.8-3.16, 3.17-3.25, i  
4 ( ) (( ) ( ))pqr p q r q p r   3.8-3.26, gen                               [Łukasiewicz’s axiom] 
Now, we will state the definitions of the two propositional constants for truth and falsity. In 
order to be available everywhere later in the development, the definitions have to be written 
as theorems, on the main stroke.  
5 p p p     Def 
6 p p      Def 
7       5, 2, e  
7.1 q       hyp  Rule e  
7.2  p p     6, rep  (derived from 7.1-7.4) 
7.3  p p     7.1, 7.2, e  n  
7.4  q      7.3, sub ( /p q )   n, e  
In the following lines, we are going to show how the new constants can be used to mimic the 
biconditional’s truth table by four theorems (lines 11-14). 
8       2, sub ( /p ) 
9       2, sub ( /p ) 
10 ( ) ( )     1, sub ( / , /p q ) 
10.1       hyp 
10.2       10.1, e  
10.3       hyp 
10.4       7, rep 
10.5       10.3, 10.4, e  
11 (      10.1-10.2, 10.3-10.5, i  
12 (      10, 11, syll  
13 ( )      7, 8, conj  
14 ( )      7, 9, conj  
The following lines are devoted to the definition of negation, and the derivation of its charac-
teristic inference rules. Lines 18, 19 correspond to the truth table for negation. 
15 ( )p p p     Def 
16 ( )      15, sub ( /p ) 
17 ( )      15, sub ( /p ) 
18      16, 11, syll  
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19      17, 14, syll  
20       19, 7, e  
20.1 p  p      hyp  Rule i  
20.2  p      hyp  (derived from 20.1-20.5) 
20.3  ( )p p     15, rep, sub ( /p p ) m  
20.4  p      20.2, 20.3, e  n  
20.5       20.1, 20.4, e    m, n, i  
20.6 p   p     hyp 
20.7       9, rep  Rule i  
20.8   ( )p    20.6, 20.7, conj  (derived from 20.6-20.13) 
20.9   ( )p    20.8, ass  n  
20.10   ( )p p    15, rep, sub ( /p p )   n, i  
20.11   p    20.9, 20.10, syll  
20.12   ( )p p   15, rep, sub ( /p p ) 
20.13   p     20.11, 20.12, e  
20.14   p     hyp 
20.15   ( )p p   15, rep, sub ( /p p ) Rule e  
20.16   p    20.14, 20.15, e  (derived from 20.14-20.22) 
20.17   ( )p p    15, rep, sub ( /p p ) n  
20.18   ( )p p    20.17, com    n, e  
20.19   ( )p    20.16, 20.18, syll  
20.20   ( )p    20.19, ass  
20.21       9, rep 
20.22   p     20.20, 20.21, e  
20.23  p p     20.6-20.13, 20.14-20.22, i  
21 p p p     20.6-20.23, gen 
Unfortunately, the rule for the introduction of negation cannot be simply derived in the same 
manner as the previous ones. Like with all the rules requiring the construction of a sub-
deduction, there is no explicit deduction with the general form of this rule. The following 
example of proof shows nevertheless that there is an available strategy corresponding to the 
introduction of negation: 
21.1  pq p q    hyp 
21.2  p p     21.1, sub ( / , /p p q p ) 
21.3  ( )p p     15, rep, sub ( /p p ) 
21.4  ( )p p     21.2, 21.3, syll  
21.5  ( )p p     21.4, ass  
21.5       21.5, 2, rep, sub ( /p p ), e  
21.6       hyp 
21.7  pq p q    21.6, e  
22 pq p q     21.1-21.5, 21.6-21.7, i  
23 pq p q     22, 15, sub ( /p pq p q ), e  
Here we could give a meta-rule matching this reductio ad absurdum strategy and stating that 
the existence of a sub-deduction beginning with a formula  as its single assumption and 
ending with  (here, lines 21.1-21.5) is sufficient to infer the formula  (here, line 23). 
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5. Conclusion 
It would have been too long here to show that PND is sufficiently strong to reach the 
complete classical propositional calculus. I can just say that that the following definition of 
the conjunction (due to Tarski, 1923) would have been adequate to do the job into my 
example of development: 
24 ) ( ( ) ( ) )pq p q f p r p f r r q f r  Def 
Nevertheless, the aim of this paper was just to show that a system very close to Fitch’s and 
Jaśkowski’s style of natural deduction systems is available to work with protothetic. With the 
exception of the rule for definitions, all the procedures and also the deductive strategies are 
very close to those to which today’s students in logic are all accustomed. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the addition of two primitive rules for the introduction 
and elimination of Leśniewski’s constant  would enable us to have a natural deduction 
system for Leśniewski’s calculus of names (the system called ontology), which is a system 
containing standard predicate logic as one of his developments. 
As a final note, it must be precised that PND is not equivalent to the full system of 
Leśniewski’s protothetic, for it lacks the means for the proofs of what we can call the laws of 
extensionality. Laws of extensionality are the formulas that express for all categories what the 
following expresses just for the basic category of propositions: 
) ( ) ( )pq p q f f p f q  
According to me, this is not a defect of PND. On the contrary, a comparative study of PND 
and PND + Ext (the system obtained by the addition of Leśniewski’s rule of extensionality) 
would open a quite stimulating research about the specificities of (still unknown) versions of 
protothetic open to intensional constants. 
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